Protecting the Homeless Under Vulnerable Victim Sentencing Guidelines: An Alternative to Inclusion in Hate Crime Laws by O\u27Keefe, Katherine B.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 52 | Issue 1 Article 7
Protecting the Homeless Under Vulnerable Victim
Sentencing Guidelines: An Alternative to Inclusion
in Hate Crime Laws
Katherine B. O'Keefe
Copyright c 2010 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Katherine B. O'Keefe, Protecting the Homeless Under Vulnerable Victim Sentencing Guidelines: An
Alternative to Inclusion in Hate Crime Laws, 52 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 301 (2010),
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol52/iss1/7
 PROTECTING THE HOMELESS UNDER VULNERABLE
VICTIM SENTENCING GUIDELINES: AN ALTERNATIVE TO
INCLUSION IN HATE CRIME LAWS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
I. ENHANCED PUNISHMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
A. Hate Crime Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
B. Vulnerable Victim Sentencing Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
C. Criticisms of Enhanced Punishments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309
II. DEHUMANIZATION OF THE HOMELESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310
III. PROTECTING THE HOMELESS UNDER VULNERABLE 
VICTIM SENTENCING GUIDELINES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313
A. Vulnerable Victim Sentencing Guidelines as a 
Flexible Alternative to Hate Crime Statutes . . . . . . . . . . . 314
B. Applying Vulnerable Victim Sentencing 
Guidelines to the Homeless . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317
1. The Fundamental Purpose of Vulnerable 
Victim Sentencing Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317
2. Specific Court Cases Involving the Federal 
Vulnerable Victim Sentencing Guideline . . . . . . . . . . . 320
a. Homelessness as a Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320
b. Homelessness as a Proxy for Vulnerability . . . . . . . . 322
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325
301
302 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:301
INTRODUCTION
Michael Roberts was a homeless1 man living in Daytona Beach,
Florida, when he was brutally attacked and killed by four teenage
boys in May 2005.2 One of the boys was only fourteen years of age,3
and another admitted to being high at the time of the attack.4 The
boys beat Roberts in three separate attacks, using sticks to hit him
and fracture his skull.5 They also jumped on a log placed on his
chest, breaking his ribs.6 
This kind of violence exhibited toward the homeless is not
uncommon, and such attacks are alarmingly random and brutal.7
Both law enforcement officials and researchers agree that the
number of attacks on the homeless has increased over the past
several years.8 In absolute terms, there have been 880 documented
attacks on the homeless over the past decade—244 of which were
fatal.9 These attacks have occurred in fifty-five different cities across
1. For the purposes of this Note, the United States Code shall provide the definition of
“homeless.” See 42 U.S.C. § 11302(a) (2006) (defining a homeless person as “(1) an individual
who lacks a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence; and (2) an individual who has
a primary nighttime residence that is ... (c) a public or private place not designed for, or
ordinarily used as, a regular sleeping accommodation for human beings”). According to the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 42 percent of the nation’s homeless
population, counting both families and individuals, is unsheltered. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. &
URBAN DEV., THE 2008 ANNUAL HOMELESS ASSESSMENT REPORT i (2009), available at
www.hudhre.info/documents/4thHomeless AssessmentReport.pdf [hereinafter GOVERNMENT
HOMELESS REPORT]. When this Note mentions a statistic, unless specified, the figure includes
both the sheltered and unsheltered homeless populations.
2. Ashley Fantz, 10-Year-Olds Attack, Beat Homeless Man, Police Say, CNN.COM, Mar.
30, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/03/29/homeless.attack/index.html.
3. Id.
4. Amy Green, Attacks on the Homeless Rise, With Youths Mostly To Blame, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 15, 2008, at A12.
5. Fantz, supra note 2.
6. Id.
7. For example, in Hollywood, a local man was charged with stabbing two homeless men
and injuring a third in broad daylight. Eric Lichtblau, Attacks on Homeless Bring Push to
Broaden Laws on Hate Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2009, at A1. In Los Angeles, a homeless
man was doused in gasoline and lit on fire. Id. And in Jacksonville, North Carolina, a man
was attacked in the back of a strip mall and stabbed in the abdomen with a broken beer
bottle. Id.
8. Id.
9. NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, HATE, VIOLENCE, AND DEATH ON MAIN STREET USA
18 (2009), available at http://www.national homeless.org/publications/hatecrimes/hate_report_
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the United States.10 And consistent with the beating death of
Michael Roberts, the perpetrators were mostly men and teenage
boys who committed these horrendous acts of violence simply for the
thrill of it.11
These trends are troubling, especially because the threat of
violence against the homeless may increase as the number of
people living on the streets grows. Although it is uncertain
whether the homeless population will expand in the near future,
two factors make this prediction a distinct possibility. First, the
ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are increasing the number
of veterans living on the streets; in 2007 alone, the Department of
Veterans Affairs reported that over 400 homeless persons were
veterans of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.12 Indeed, war
veterans are more susceptible to becoming homeless because they
frequently suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder or traumatic
brain injuries.13 To cope with these conditions, many veterans turn
to alcohol and drugs, which makes it harder for them to maintain an
existence in mainstream society.14 Moreover, those veterans who
have been on multiple tours in Afghanistan or Iraq often experience
difficulty adjusting back into family and work life.15 As long as the
wars continue, and more soldiers return to U.S. soil, this problem of
neglected, homeless veterans has the potential to escalate.16 
The second factor that will likely contribute to an expanding
homeless population is the recent economic downturn and the
housing crisis. Foreclosures are forcing individuals and families to
leave their homes and seek shelter elsewhere. In 2009, an average
of 10 percent of the people living in homeless shelters had lost their
2008.pdf [hereinafter COALITION HOMELESS REPORT].
10. Id. at 23-24.
11. Lichtblau, supra note 7, at A1; see also COALITION HOMELESS REPORT, supra note 9,
at 10, 20 (finding that, in 2008, 43 percent of the attacks on the homeless were committed by
teenagers between the ages of 13 and 19, 73 percent of the accused or convicted attackers
were under the age of 25, and 106 of the 109 accused or convicted attackers were male);
Green, supra note 4, at A12 (stating that many attacks are made by young men who view
attacking the homeless as a sport).
12. Erik Eckholm, Surge Seen in Number of Homeless Veterans, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2007,
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homes to foreclosure.17 In the Midwest, high foreclosure and unem-
ployment rates were factors for 15 percent of the newly homeless.18
California, Michigan, and Florida also have a large number of newly
homeless individuals and families due to high foreclosure rates.19
As long as the housing and job markets stay depressed, home
foreclosure is sure to be a factor in the potential growth of the
country’s homeless population.
In response to the rise in violence against the homeless and the
potential growth in the homeless population, many advocacy groups
have urged legislatures to pass legal reforms that deter such
violence by punishing more severely those who attack the homeless.
These groups advance two principal ways to accomplish this
objective. The first is to add the homeless to federal and state hate
crime statutes, an approach that Maryland has already adopted.20
The second is to apply federal and state vulnerable victim sen-
tencing guidelines to those who are convicted of attacking the
homeless.21 This Note explores the reasons why vulnerable victim
sentencing guidelines provide a viable and preferable alternative to
hate crime statutes for protecting the homeless against violent
crimes.22 
Part I of this Note explores the theories that support hate crime
statutes and vulnerable victim sentencing guidelines, and then
analyzes the general criticisms of enhanced punishments. Part II
17. See Peter S. Goodman, From Foreclosure to the Car to a Shelter Bed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
19, 2009, at A1. Although this Note is mainly concerned with those homeless who do not seek
the protection of shelters, statistics for those homeless who live on the street are unreliable
and widely unavailable.
18. See id.
19. Id. at A17. Interestingly, California and Florida were the two states with the highest
number of attacks on the homeless. See COALITION HOMELESS REPORT, supra note 9, at 23-24.
20. See MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW § 10-301 (West 2009). The District of Columbia also
approved a measure to include the homeless in its hate crime laws. See Lichtblau, supra note
7, at A1. Legislatures in California, Florida, Ohio, South Carolina, and Texas are considering
legislation that would add penalties for attacks on the homeless. Id. at A11. Similarly, in
2009, Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, a Democrat from Texas, proposed a bill in the
U.S. House of Representatives to add the homeless to the Hate Crime Statistics Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 534 (2006). See H.R. 3419, 111th Cong. (2009).
21. See infra Part III.
22. For general application and illustrative purposes, this Note focuses on the federal
vulnerable victim sentencing guideline, as compared to the federal hate crime sentencing
guideline, rather than delving into state-specific law. State law, however, is extremely
important in prosecuting criminal defendants, and is mentioned when appropriate.
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examines the dehumanization of the homeless through laws
affecting their livelihood and shows that, in theory, laws reflect the
values of society. Part III analyzes the application of vulnerable
victim sentencing guidelines to those convicted of attacking the
homeless, and explains why this approach is practical. This Note
argues that the homeless do not belong in hate crime statutes
because homelessness is not an immutable trait, nor is it a category
that applies equally to everyone. Instead, legislatures should add
homelessness to vulnerable victim sentencing guidelines so that
courts will be required to take into account the homelessness of the
victim when calculating the advisory sentencing range. Vulnerable
victim sentencing guidelines provide the greater protection that
society should give to the homeless, can be applied by the judicial
system immediately,23 and supply a flexible, rather than stagnant,
standard. 
I. ENHANCED PUNISHMENTS
Advocates for the homeless have proposed two forms of enhanced
punishment to protect the homeless against violent crimes: hate
crime laws and vulnerable victim sentencing guidelines. All
enhanced sentencing guidelines piggyback onto other criminal
statutes.24 For both hate crime and vulnerable victim enhance-
ments, however, the federal sentencing guidelines are advisory and
not mandatory.25 Parts I.A and I.B will discuss these two enhanced
23. Even if homelessness is not immediately added to vulnerable victim sentencing
guidelines, the judge could choose to use homelessness as a factor in determining the
appropriate sentence for the defendant if the guideline has a catchall phrase. See infra note
38 and accompanying text.
24. See FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN LAW
93 (1999). For example, consider a defendant who has beaten a homeless man unconscious
and is charged with and convicted of aggravated assault. Under the federal sentencing
guidelines, aggravated assault carries with it a base offense level of fourteen. U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A2.2(a) (2009). If the defendant has no prior criminal
history, the sentencing range provided by the guidelines for a level fourteen offense is fifteen
to twenty-one months imprisonment. Id. § 5A. If the court finds that the homeless victim is
“vulnerable” under section 3A1.1(b), then the offense level is increased by two levels, to level
sixteen, thus increasing the sentencing range to twenty-one to twenty-seven months. See id.
§§ 3A1.1(b), 5A.
25. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005). This development has not
rendered the sentencing guidelines ineffective. In fact, the Supreme Court later stated that
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punishments in more detail, and Part I.C will discuss criticisms of
both.
A. Hate Crime Laws
Both federal and state legislatures have enacted hate crime
statues. The main federal hate crime sentencing guideline that calls
for enhanced punishment states: 
If the finder of fact at trial or, in the case of a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere, the court at sentencing determines beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally selected any
victim or any property as the object of the offense of conviction
because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national
origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation of any
person, increase [the punishment] by 3 levels.26
Although most states have a version of this law, each statute’s
definitions, scope, penalties, and punishment enhancements vary
greatly. The basic premise is that a victim of a hate crime was
the guidelines should always be the “starting point and the initial benchmark” for sentencing
in a district court, even though they are no longer the only factor that needs to be considered.
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007). The Supreme Court recently expanded on this
holding, stating that the sentencing court should calculate a sentence range using the
guidelines, but then determine if the range is appropriate given the set of facts. Nelson v.
United States, 129 S. Ct. 890, 891 (2009). The Court also held that the district court can no
longer presume that the sentencing guidelines are reasonable. Id. at 892. Subsequent court
decisions have found that, under Nelson, the guidelines are still an important factor in
deciding the defendant’s sentence; however, the reasonableness of the sentence prescribed by
the guidelines must be determined by the arguments given by both parties and any other
factors that the sentencing court finds compelling. See, e.g., United States v. Davila-Gonzalez,
595 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2010) (distinguishing “between according a presumption of
reasonableness to the [federal sentencing guidelines] ... and finding that the [guidelines], in
a particular case, represent[ ] an appropriate sentencing range”) (emphasis omitted); United
States v. Alexander, 339 F. App’x 941, 945 (11th Cir. 2009) (arguing that, following the
outcome in Nelson, the district court did not err in sentencing when it listened to the
arguments of both parties and required a “compelling reason” for a downward departure from
the sentence prescribed by the guidelines); United States v. Bain, 586 F.3d 634, 638 (8th Cir.
2009) (finding that the district court did not apply a presumption of reasonableness when
determining a sentence, but instead properly considered the sentencing guideline as an
important factor among many to consider).
26. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 24, § 3A1.1(a).
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attacked because of a particular protected aspect of his or her
identity, not for whom he or she is as a person.27 
The main goal of hate crime statutes is to protect certain self-
identifying groups: individuals brought together around a shared
purpose and a sense of loyalty regarding a particular characteris-
tic.28 A self-identifying group is something stronger than a random
collection of people with a common identity trait.29 It has been
observed that this common attribute often is immutable or costly to
change.30 This observation is certainly true when it comes to a
characteristic such as race or gender. Immutability, however, has
not been the sole factor in determining which groups hate crime
legislation should protect. State hate crime statues may also include
other, arguably mutable, personal traits, such as religious belief,
marital status, and political affiliation.31 Although there is no defi-
nite consensus as to which groups should be included in hate crime
laws, the laws generally protect self-identifying groups.
Hate crime laws try to accomplish two additional intangible goals.
A hate crime leaves an ongoing fear in the targeted self-identifying
group within a particular community.32 Hate crime laws try to
ameliorate that fear by both increasing public awareness of the
violence committed against a certain group in society, and providing
protection to groups that are commonly marginalized by law en-
27. See Michael Blake, Geeks and Monsters: Bias Crimes and Social Identity, 20 LAW &
PHIL. 121, 123 (2001).
28. Id. at 125-26.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., id. at 125; Raegan Joern, Mean Streets: Violence Against the Homeless and
the Makings of a Hate Crime, 6 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 305, 327 (2009).
31. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 22-3701 (2009) (“‘Bias-related crime’ means a designated act that
demonstrates an accused’s prejudice based on the actual or perceived race, color, religion,
national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation, gender
identity or expression, family responsibility, homelessness, physical disability, matriculation,
or political affiliation of a victim.”) (emphasis added); IOWA CODE § 729A.2 (2009) (“‘Hate
crime’ means one of the following public offenses when committed against a person or a
person’s property because of the person’s race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin,
political affiliation, sex, sexual orientation, age, or disability, or the person’s association with
a person of a certain race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, political affiliation, sex,
sexual orientation, age, or disability.”) (emphasis added); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-20 (2009)
(providing protection on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, ancestry, national origin,
political affiliation or disability”) (emphasis added). Religion is not immutable and is usually
not thought of as being costly to change in a monetary sense, but in all states that have
enacted hate crime legislation, religion or creed is listed among the protected identity groups. 
32. See Blake, supra note 27, at 132; Joern, supra note 30, at 328.
308 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:301
forcement and the courts.33 These laws send an important message
to society that crimes against certain groups will not be tolerated,
and thus deserve a heightened level of punishment.
B. Vulnerable Victim Sentencing Guidelines
As is the case with hate crime laws, federal and state legislatures
have also passed vulnerable victim sentencing guidelines. The
federal vulnerable victim sentencing guideline provides that “[i]f the
defendant knew or should have known that a victim of the offense
was a vulnerable victim, increase [the punishment] by 2 levels.”34 A
“vulnerable victim” is defined as one “who is unusually vulnerable
due to age, physical or mental condition, or who is otherwise par-
ticularly susceptible to the criminal conduct.”35 The vulnerability
of a victim is also a sentencing factor written into several state
laws, with Alaska specifically naming homelessness in its statute.36
It should be noted, however, that these state provisions identify
particular characteristics that render a victim vulnerable, thus
limiting protection to those groups.37 In comparison, the federal
33. Jane Spade & Craig Willse, Confronting the Limits of Gay Hate Crimes Activism: A
Radical Critique, 21 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 38, 39-41 (2000).
34. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 24, § 3A1.1(b)(1).
35. Id. § 3A1.1 cmt. n.2.
36. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c)(5) (2009) (stating that the sentencing court can
impose a sentence above the stated range if “the defendant knew or reasonably should have
known that the victim of the offense was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance
due to advanced age, disability, ill health, homelessness, or extreme youth or was for any
other reason substantially incapable of exercising normal physical or mental powers of
resistance”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-804(c)(2)(B) (West 2009) (declaring that the sentencing
judge may depart from the presumptive sentence when “[t]he offender knew or should have
known that the victim was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance due to extreme
youth, advanced age, disability, or ill health”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(m) (West 2009)
(describing an aggravated circumstance as when “[t]he victim of the capital felony was
particularly vulnerable due to advanced age or disability, or because the defendant stood in
a position of familial or custodial authority over the victim”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
4716(c)(2)(A) (2008) (stating that an aggravating factor includes when “[t]he victim was
particularly vulnerable due to age, infirmity, or reduced physical or mental capacity which
was known or should have been known to the offender”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137.085 (West
2009) (asserting that, in determining if a sentence enhancement is warranted, “the court shall
give consideration to a victim's particular vulnerability to injury in such case, due to the
victim’s youth, advanced age or physical disability”).
37. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c)(5) (limiting probation to characteristics such as
“age, disability, ill health, homelessness or extreme youth”).
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standard includes a catchall clause providing protection to anyone
“who is otherwise particularly susceptible to ... criminal conduct.”38 
The vulnerable victim sentencing adjustment attempts to protect
particular groups within society, but these groups do not self-
identify through a specific characteristic. Instead, the groups are
based around characteristics that make the members of that group
especially “vulnerable” or “susceptible” to criminal conduct.39 In
other words, a group may have a particular trait in common, such
as advanced age, but it is not the advanced age that affords them
protection. Instead, it is the vulnerability that may come from ad-
vanced age that grants them special protection under the vulnerable
victim sentencing enhancement. Because of the victim’s perceived
vulnerability, the defendant has demonstrated a greater depravity
in his choice of victim, and thus should be punished in accordance
with this greater depravity.40 
Whereas both the hate crime statutes and the vulnerable victim
statutes attempt to protect certain groups in society, they differ in
the type of groups that they aim to protect. Hate crime statutes base
enhanced punishment on a particular group’s shared characteris-
tics and whether the victim was harmed because he or she was a
member of that group. The vulnerable victim sentencing guide-
lines, however, are applied after the court conducts a case-by-case
assessment of the victim’s individual characteristics. Although the
two enhanced punishments protect different groups in society, they
work in similar ways, and thus share the same criticisms.
C. Criticisms of Enhanced Punishments
Enhanced punishment has come under fire for being a superficial
solution to deeply-rooted societal intolerances.41 Some have argued
that hate crime statutes act as a band-aid, relying on “the criminal
justice system and that system’s punitive measures” to correct
38. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 24, § 3A1.1 cmt. n.2.
39. Lu-in Wang, Recognizing Opportunistic Bias Crimes, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1399, 1421 (2000).
40. See Jay Dyckman, Brightening the Line: Properly Identifying a Vulnerable Victim for
Purposes of Section 3A1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1960, 1962
(1998).
41. Most of this criticism has been about hate crime statutes, rather than vulnerable
victim sentencing guidelines; however, the criticism can usually be applied to both types of
sentence enhancements.
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problems that are embedded in society’s prejudices.42 By focusing
on the punishment of individuals, the legislature is stating that
the people committing violent acts are the problem, substantially
ignoring the practices or institutions that create the prejudice in the
first place.43 Enhanced punishment statutes also draw a dichoto-
mous line between biased and nonbiased actions based on acts of
violence, essentially ignoring smaller acts of injustice that perpetu-
ate the identity group’s subordination.44
Although it is true that enhanced sentences do not address the
underlying, systemic problems that cause the prejudice against
certain groups, they do send an important message to the commu-
nity about how these particular crimes should be treated. Enhanced
punishment shows community condemnation of a particular crime.45
In essence, the legislation identifies one class of criminal action that
is more deserving of harsh punishment than similar crimes.46 This
enhanced punishment validates the notion that the community is
willing to lend extra protection to certain groups that may be more
susceptible to criminal conduct. In conjunction with efforts to treat
systemic problems, enhanced sentences can be a very powerful tool
in combating prejudice.
II. DEHUMANIZATION OF THE HOMELESS
Society’s dehumanization of the homeless has played a role in
the increased vulnerability of the group. If a society’s laws treat a
subsection of its population as second-class citizens, then it follows
that society as a whole will do the same. African Americans fighting
42. Spade & Willse, supra note 33, at 43; see also Paula C. Johnson, The Social
Construction of Identity in Criminal Cases: Cinema Verité and the Pedagogy of Vincent Chin,
1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 347, 384-85 (1996).
43. See Sally Kohn, Greasing the Wheel: How the Criminal Justice System Hurts Gay,
Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgendered People and Why Hate Crime Laws Won’t Save Them,
27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 257, 272 (2002); see also Spade & Willse, supra note 33, at
46.
44. Spade & Willse, supra note 33, at 46.
45. See Depp v. State, 686 P.2d 712, 721 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984); see also Dan M. Kahan,
The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 463 (1999); Jordan Blair Woods,
Comment, Taking the “Hate” Out of Hate Crimes: Applying Unfair Advantage Theory To
Justify the Enhanced Punishment of Opportunistic Bias Crimes, 56 UCLA L. REV. 489, 539-40
(2008).
46. Blake, supra note 27, at 138.
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for their civil rights and homosexuals fighting for adoption rights
used this argument, which may also be applied to the homeless.47
Moreover, across the country, laws criminalize certain actions of
the homeless in particular situations.48 For example, St. Petersburg,
Florida, passed six new ordinances in 2007 that prohibited activities
such as panhandling, storing belongings on public property, and
sleeping in various outdoor public areas.49 Kalamazoo, Michigan,
has an ordinance prohibiting sleeping in public parks.50 Although
no one has been convicted of violating this ordinance, several people
have been arrested and numerous homeless persons have been
ticketed for violating it.51 Additionally, law enforcement often per-
form “sweeps” of certain areas known to house the homeless in an
effort to drive them elsewhere, often destroying their personal
belongings and makeshift shelters in the process.52 In Las Vegas, for
example, “crackdowns” on homeless encampments have made the
homeless more visible—and vulnerable—than ever.53 Some of these
homeless have resorted to living in flood tunnels, which can fill
within seconds, in order to be less vulnerable to human threats.54
These laws and their enforcement cement the status of the
homeless as second-class citizens by infringing on their livelihood
and disrespecting their property. This dehumanization has trickled
into society’s perception of the homeless. “Bum fight” videos have
become extremely popular on the Internet.55 These videos depict
boys and young men beating the homeless, or show the homeless
47. See Marisa Gonzalez, Note & Comment, If You Can’t Fix It, You’ve Got To Stand It:
Lofton v. Secretary of Department of Children and Family Services and the Florida Adoption
Statute’s Discrimination Against Homosexuals and Foster Children, 7 WHITTIER J. CHILD &
FAM. ADVOC. 277, 309-10 (2008).
48. See Tami Iwamoto, Adding Insult to Injury: Criminalization of Homelessness in Los
Angeles, 29 WHITTIER L. REV. 515, 528 (2007) (discussing the criminalization of actions such
as sleeping and sitting).
49. NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY & NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS,
HOMES NOT HANDCUFFS: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 36 (2009),
available at http://www.nationalhomeless.org/ publications/crimreport/CrimzReport_2009.pdf
[hereinafter CRIMINALIZATION REPORT].
50. KALAMAZOO, MICH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-23 (2009).
51. CRIMINALIZATION REPORT, supra note 49, at 41.
52. Id. at 10.
53. Lichtblau, supra note 7, at A1.
54. Id. at A11.
55. Id.
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fighting each other in exchange for money, alcohol, or food.56 A
recent search of “bum fight” on YouTube yielded a result of 10,600
videos.57 Moreover, because of hostility from the police, the criminal
justice system, and society at large, the homeless are usually re-
luctant to seek proper remedies when subjected to violence.58
Despite this trend of dehumanization, conditions for the homeless
have improved in some areas. In 2006, the Ninth Circuit found that
an ordinance that criminalized sitting, lying, or sleeping on public
streets and sidewalks violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
of cruel and unusual punishment when it was enforced against all
people, at all times, and in all places within Los Angeles.59 Although
the court’s opinion is a positive step in the right direction, it points
out that narrower statutes in force in other major U.S. cities do not
violate the Eighth Amendment because they do not apply at all
times and in all places.60 Courts also have started to compare the
status of being homeless with that of being an alcoholic or a drug
addict.61 Although this may be seen by some as a negative compari-
son, it simply puts the homeless within a category of persons who
should not be punished for their status alone. To clarify, a homeless
individual, like a drug addict or an alcoholic, should not be punished
for “an involuntary act or condition if it is the unavoidable conse-
quence of [his or her] status or being.”62 These individual court
decisions show a growing understanding of the needs of the home-
less.
Some cities have taken a more lenient approach to the enforce-
ment of ordinances that overwhelmingly affect the homeless, or
have instituted programs meant to benefit the homeless. A city
manager in Ventura, California, for example, has allowed car-
camping in designated areas for those homeless who have a car in
56. See id.
57. YouTube, http://www.youtube.com (last visited Mar. 3, 2010).
58. See Spade & Willse, supra note 33, at 40.
59. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 505 F.3d 1006
(9th Cir. 2007). Although the opinion was vacated, and is thus nonbinding authority, it is still
informative and persuasive. See Lehr v. City of San Francisco, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1225-26
(E.D. Cal. 2009). 
60. Jones, 444 F.3d at 1123.
61. See id. at 1131-37 (discussing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), in which
the Supreme Court found that being addicted to the use of narcotics is a status, and not an
act, and thus the State may not punish an addict who has not committed a separate act).
62. Id. at 1135.
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which to sleep.63 In Daytona Beach, Florida, the city is working with
service providers and local businesses to provide the homeless with
temporary housing in exchange for their time and manpower in
cleaning up the downtown area.64 In Cleveland, instead of restrict-
ing food sharing programs like some other cities have chosen to do,
the local government is working with outreach services to improve
food distribution to the city’s homeless.65 
In sum, being homeless is not illegal, but certain actions that
are important to the livelihood of the homeless, when exhibited in
certain areas, are illegal. This criminalization labels the homeless
as second-class citizens. Due to their treatment as second-class
citizens, the homeless are more likely to be treated in a dehumaniz-
ing manner, ranging from avoidance on the street, to exploitation of
their status in degrading videos, to the more extreme violence that
has been inflicted on certain members of the population. Although
additional protection for those who break the law is not the proper
solution, it is partly the dehumanizing aspect of these laws that
make the homeless susceptible to violence. Therefore, the homeless
deserve consideration as vulnerable victims under the federal vul-
nerable victim sentencing guideline. To take it one step further,
the potential protection of the homeless under the guidelines is a
natural extension of the process of rehumanizing the status of
homelessness.
III. PROTECTING THE HOMELESS UNDER VULNERABLE VICTIM
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Vulnerable victim sentencing guidelines are an appropriate,
existing method to protect the homeless from violence. First,
homelessness is a mutable characteristic of a person’s identity, and
because it encompasses only a subsection of the population, it
cannot and does not apply to everyone equally. Additionally,
homelessness is a condition that society is constantly trying to
improve through various social services and programs. A flexible
standard is more suitable for such a subsection of society. Second,
63. Goodman, supra note 17, at A17.
64. See CRIMINALIZATION REPORT, supra note 49, at 12.
65. Id. at 30.
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protecting the homeless under the federal vulnerable victim
sentencing guideline logically follows from the reasoning behind
present applications of the guideline. Part III.A explores the flex-
ibility of the vulnerable victim sentencing guidelines and Part III.B
discusses its current and potential application.
A. Vulnerable Victim Sentencing Guidelines as a Flexible    
Alternative to Hate Crime Statutes
As a group, the homeless require a flexible standard to provide
them with increased protection, but most of the recent legislation
regarding crimes against the homeless proposes adding the
homeless as a protected class under inflexible hate crime statutes.66
Although this is a viable option, and hate crime statutes are
necessary and important to protect certain groups against discrimi-
natory violence, expanding the scope of the protected identity groups
to encompass the homeless would dilute the power of the laws.67
Hate crime legislation protects self-identifying groups that have a
shared sense of purpose.68 Inclusion of the homeless would change
this underlying purpose. 
Unlike groups protected by hate crime statutes, the homeless
are not a self-identifying group. Because homelessness is usually
involuntary, it is generally not a welcome addition to a person’s
identity.69 Soaring unemployment and home foreclosures have
driven many individuals and families out onto the street.70 These
people are homeless solely because of the economic downturn, and
it can hardly be assumed that homelessness is a desirable or
permanent part of their self-identity. Additionally, mental illness is
one of the leading causes of homelessness because states often fail
to support deinstitutionalized persons suffering from psychiatric
problems.71 Mental illness is not a choice, and even if it can be
treated, it is an immutable characteristic of a person’s being.72 It
66. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
67. Allison Marston Danner, Bias Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: Culpability in
Context, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 389, 446-47 (2002).
68. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
69. See Blake, supra note 27, at 125-26.
70. See Lichtblau, supra note 7, at A1; see also supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
71. Iwamoto, supra note 48, at 521.
72. Id.
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would be hard to say that homelessness caused by mental illness is
an appreciated aspect of one’s identity. Because homelessness is
usually an unwanted addition to a person’s sense of self, it is
impossible to conclude that the homeless as a group have a shared
sense of purpose or loyalty toward one another.73 Hate crime
statutes should not afford protection to a group like the homeless,
who do not have a shared purpose.
Moving past the theoretical basis of hate crime statutes, these
laws play into “identity politics.”74 In order for any legislature to
include a certain identity group in its hate crime legislation, that
group needs to have activists lobbying on its behalf; those groups
that are too weak or scattered to have a political voice, such as the
homeless, will be left out of the political process.75 Because of this
problem, and because legislatures determine the border delineating
who deserves protection by hate crime legislation, it could take a
long time for the homeless to be added as a protected group.76
Legislatures can be slow to react, and may not react at all. For
example, only thirty-two states have hate crime statutes that
protect on the basis of sexual orientation, “twenty-eight on the basis
of gender, and less than ten include disability.”77 In contrast, the
vulnerable victim sentencing guideline is a flexible standard. Courts
may apply the extra protection in any jurisdiction that allows for a
vulnerable victim sentencing enhancement based on any factor,
regardless of whether it is specifically enumerated in the statute.78
Lastly, the characteristics included in hate crime laws are either
immutable or ones that can be applied equally to all persons.79 For
example, the “disability” category does not apply to all persons
because not all persons have a disability; however, a disability is an
immutable characteristic of a person’s being. And although religion
73. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
74. Spade & Willse, supra note 33, at 39.
75. See id. at 39-40.
76. See Blake, supra note 27, at 124.
77. COALITION HOMELESS REPORT, supra note 9, at 35.
78. It certainly would be more effective to add homelessness as a factor to vulnerable
victim sentencing guidelines, but in the meantime, a broad construction of the guidelines
could suffice.
79. See generally Scott Steiner, Habitations of Cruelty: The Pitfalls of Expanding Hate
Crime Legislation to Include the Homeless, 45 CRIM. L. BULL. ART 4 (2009) (arguing that the
homeless should not be included in hate crime statutes because hate crime statutes are
intended to protect everyone equally).
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is not an immutable characteristic of a person’s identity, the
protection that the category provides applies to all persons equally.
It applies, for example, if a person is attacked for being Episcopa-
lian, Muslim, or atheist; all persons are protected by the inclusion
of religion in hate crime statutes. 
Homelessness as a protected category does not fit into either of
these generalizations. Although there are chronic homeless indiv-
iduals, it is not an immutable characteristic of a person’s identity.
Additionally, homelessness as a category does not protect all
persons equally. It protects only those who are, in fact, homeless.
For the homeless, a more flexible standard, such as the vulnerable
victim sentencing guideline provides greater—and more appropriate
—protection.
An argument against the use of vulnerable victim sentencing
guidelines to deal with violence against the homeless is that they
do not address the harm caused by “bias crime.”80 But if this claim
is true, then it is also true of hate crime statutes. Both hate crime
statutes and vulnerable victim sentencing guidelines have the
same end result: a harsher sentence for someone who targets a
specific victim based on a perceived identity or vulnerability.
Neither approach, however, can adequately address the harm
without addressing the systemic problems that led to the prejudice
in the first place. Instead, “society needs to use legislation that is
flexible enough to accommodate varying prejudices and conse-
quently better equipped to promote equality of protection in a
changing environment.”81 The recognition of certain groups as
having a legally protected identity can evolve over time, and this is
especially true of the homeless.82 It is a fraction of the population
that society as a whole is actively trying to shrink through govern-
ment and nonprofit programs.83 Additionally, it is a mutable status
that does not include everyone within the scope of its protection. It
80. See, e.g., Joern, supra note 30, at 331.
81. Alon Harel & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Hate and Equality, 109 YALE L.J. 507, 536
(1999).
82. Compare Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2006), with Joyce v.
City and County of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (homelessness was
deemed a “condition” that was not constitutionally protected in Joyce, but in Jones, which was
decided twelve years later, homelessness was a status that could be protected constitutionally
by the Eighth Amendment).
83. See Steiner, supra note 79, at 18-19.
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makes little sense to add to hate crime statutes an identity category
that is mutable, applies to only a certain subsection of the popula-
tion, and is a condition that society is constantly trying to amelio-
rate. An identity of this type is much better suited to the underlying
purpose of vulnerable victim sentencing guidelines.
B. Applying Vulnerable Victim Sentencing Guidelines to the
Homeless
Applying an enhanced sentence to those who commit acts of
violence against the homeless is a natural extension of vulnerable
victim sentencing guidelines. The homeless fall easily into the
underlying justification for the statute, as it has been defined by the
federal courts and interpreted by scholars.84 The courts could apply
the vulnerable victim sentencing guideline to defendants found
guilty of crimes against the homeless because the definition of
“vulnerable victim” includes the catchall phrase “who is otherwise
particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct.”85 Alternatively, the
federal and state legislatures could amend their guidelines to
include the homeless within the definition of vulnerable victim, as
Alaska has done.86
1. The Fundamental Purpose of Vulnerable Victim Sentencing
Guidelines
The underlying motivation of the federal vulnerable victim
sentencing provision is to give extra protection from criminal
activity to those in society who need it.87 By definition, homeless
persons lack the protection of physical shelter. The actions of
the homeless, some of which are necessary for living, are often
illegal.88 Additionally, the homeless are victimized through cruel
YouTube videos and other outlets that treat them as second-class
84. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
85. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 24, § 3A1.1 cmt. n.2.
86. See supra note 36; see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1151(8)(B) (2006) (allowing
judges to consider a victim’s homeless status when considering sentencing for the offender).
87. See United States v. Castellanos, 81 F.3d 108, 110-11 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he victims
to whom § 3A1.1 applies are those who are in need of greater societal protection.”); see also
Dyckman, supra note 40, at 1987; Harel & Parchomovsky, supra note 81, at 531.
88. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
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citizens.89 In 2008 alone, there were 106 reported violent acts
committed against the homeless.90 In sum, because they have been
deemed socially acceptable targets, the homeless as a group are
more vulnerable than the general population, and thus deserve the
protection afforded under vulnerable victim sentencing guidelines.91
Crimes against the homeless are not always violent, nor are
homeless victims always sympathetic. But victims need not be
sympathetic or have suffered greatly in order to qualify as vulnera-
ble.92 This definitional standard is key for those homeless who may
not receive much sympathy from society, namely, those who are
homeless because of alcoholism or drug addiction. Such lack of sym-
pathy within vulnerable victim sentencing guidelines is important
for those crimes that are less horrific than the homeless man who
was stabbed in the stomach with a broken bottle93 or the homeless
man set on fire,94 but are nonetheless deserving of some enhanced
punishment because the defendant chose a more vulnerable member
of society as his or her victim.
One of the key elements in applying a vulnerable victim sen-
tencing guideline is the defendant’s choice of victim. In order to be
eligible for the sentence enhancement, “the defendant generally
must have singled out the vulnerable victim[ ] from a larger class of
potential victims.”95 In many cases, the defendant could easily have
committed an act of violence against a nonhomeless person, but the
homeless person was singled out as a target because of the percep-
tion that the homeless are second-class citizens within society.96 In
89. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
90. COALITION HOMELESS REPORT, supra note 9, at 19. These violent acts included fifty-
four beatings, twenty-seven deaths, nine rapes, eight shootings, three men set on fire, and five
incidents involving police harassment or brutality. Id.
91. See Wang, supra note 39, at 1428-29 (discussing several reasons why some groups are
more vulnerable than others).
92. See Dyckman, supra note 40, at 1987.
93. See Lichtblau, supra note 7, at A1.
94. See id.
95. United States v. McCall, 174 F.3d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 1998).
96. For example, when William Sigler, who plead guilty to the second-degree murder of
Samuel Webster Hood, Jr., a homeless man in Frederick, Maryland, was told that the victim
whose murder was being investigated was Hood’s, he responded, “Oh him, he’s just a beggar,
a vagrant.” COALITION HOMELESS REPORT, supra note 9, at 62. Similarly, a homeless man in
Boston was murdered in broad daylight, yet only one witness has come forward because, as
one man describes, there is a “[d]on’t ask, [d]on’t tell” policy, in which most people simply
ignore what they see. Id. at 65. 
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addition to this perception, the homeless are often singled out for
other reasons that make them vulnerable, such as being intoxicated
or sleeping in public.97 Indeed, on any single night, approximately
half of all homeless individuals are unsheltered.98 Being publicly
exposed for twenty-four hours per day puts the homeless at risk for
robbery, harassment, beatings, and worse. Additionally, homeless
victims may be sleeping at the time of the attack or suffering from
mental or physical ailments, any of which would make it much less
likely that they could protect themselves from the crime.
When imposing a harsher sentence because of the vulnerable
victim sentencing guideline, courts should focus on the extent to
which the victim could defend him or herself from the crime.99
According to precedent, this inquiry should be done on a case-by-
case basis.100 The vulnerable victim sentencing enhancement thus
would not apply simply because the victim is homeless. But in most,
if not all, cases, the homeless are particularly vulnerable because of
their inability to protect themselves from criminal attack. 
Courts should also apply the vulnerable victim sentencing en-
hancement when defendants target a victim either because they
think that the victim would not report the crime or that law
enforcement would not take the crime seriously.101 The homeless
often do not report crimes because of hostility that they have
received from law enforcement and society.102 George Siletti, a
former homeless drifter, said that “[p]eople seem to pick on the most
vulnerable because they really think that they won’t do nothing
97. A defendant may pick homeless persons who appear intoxicated for a target because
they are less able to put up a fight and identify the attacker. See, e.g., id. at 78-79. The same
is true for homeless persons who are attacked while sleeping. See id. at 79; see also infra notes
116-30 and accompanying text.
98. GOVERNMENT HOMELESS REPORT, supra note 1, at ii.
99. See United States v. Crispo, 306 F.3d 71, 83 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding that a three- or
four-year-old child is a vulnerable victim within the context of kidnappings); United States
v. Dupre, 462 F.3d 131, 144 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that a group of evangelical Christians were
no less likely to be vulnerable to fraud than the general population).
100. See Crispo, 306 F.3d at 83 (explaining that a court should not apply the vulnerable
victim sentencing enhancement simply because a victim was a member of a particular class
or group). But see Wang, supra note 39, at 1426 (arguing that courts properly apply the
vulnerable victim sentencing adjustment in cases where the defendant chose the victim from
a particular social group based on the perception that the group is socially vulnerable).
101. Wang, supra note 39, at 1426.
102. See COALITION HOMELESS REPORT, supra note 9, at 10; Green, supra note 4, at A12.
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[sic].”103 So even if a homeless individual was attacked, and he or
she was not sleeping or handicapped in any way, the vulnerable
victim sentencing enhancement could still apply. The homeless
individual would be vulnerable due to the fact that the defendant
thought the victim would not report the crime, or, if reported, law
enforcement would not do anything about it.
Applying vulnerable victim sentencing enhancements to the
homeless is consistent with the underlying purpose of the enhance-
ment. The homeless are less able to protect themselves from crime,
and are in dire need of more protection from society. They are often
robbed or attacked because the attacker thinks that the homeless
individual will not report the crime or that law enforcement will not
take the crime seriously. All of these justifications can work on a
case-by-case basis, which is how courts currently apply the sentenc-
ing enhancement.
2. Specific Court Cases Involving the Federal Vulnerable Victim
Sentencing Guideline
Examining several cases in which courts have applied an
enhanced sentence after finding that the victim had been particu-
larly vulnerable clarifies how the standard would also apply to a
homeless victim. In one set of cases, courts found homelessness to
be a factor in making a victim vulnerable for purposes of the
statute. In a second set of cases, courts discuss factors that could
assist in finding a homeless victim vulnerable in conjunction with
his or her homeless status.
a. Homelessness as a Factor
In United States v. Irving, the Second Circuit found that a victim
was vulnerable independent of his age because he was homeless and
without parental supervision.104 Irving had been convicted of
traveling outside the United States to engage in sex with a minor.105
He appealed the decision, arguing, amongst other things, that the
103. Green, supra note 4, at A12.
104. 554 F.3d 64, 75 (2d Cir. 2009).
105. Id. at 67.
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vulnerable victim sentencing enhancement was not applicable to the
offense because the offense already took into account the age of the
victim.106 The court disagreed, finding that other factors also made
the victim vulnerable. One of these factors was the victim’s home-
lessness coupled with a lack of parental supervision.107 
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has decided two cases in which
homelessness was a factor in applying the vulnerable victim
sentencing adjustment. In the first, United States v. Bragg, the
court allowed a sentencing enhancement because the victims were
“particularly susceptible due to their poverty, homelessness and
other factors.”108 The defendants were convicted of fraudulently
using Social Security numbers to obtain false identification cards for
workers hired from a homeless shelter in order to further their
conspiracy to remove asbestos in violation of the Clean Air Act.109 In
the defendants’ appeal, they raised the argument that economic
status can never be a factor in finding a victim particularly vulnera-
ble.110 The court skirted a direct response to this argument by
stating that the sentencing judge did not rely solely on the victims’
unemployment.111 In addition to the victims’ homelessness, the
judge also considered that the victims may have been suffering
from illiteracy, drug and alcohol addiction, and psychiatric problems
when ruling that they were vulnerable for purposes of the statute.112
The second Seventh Circuit case, United States v. Julian, held
that the victim’s homeless status was a valid factor in determining
whether to apply the vulnerable victim sentencing enhancement.
Julian was convicted of aiding and abetting the transportation of a
minor in foreign commerce with the intent to engage the minor in
prostitution.113 In this case, the homelessness of the minor was the
only deciding factor in applying the vulnerable victim sentencing
adjustment because the defendant had already received a separate
106. Courts should not apply the vulnerable victim adjustment if “the factor that makes
the person a vulnerable victim is incorporated in the offense guideline.” U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 24, § 3A1.1 cmt. n.2.
107. Irving, 554 F.3d at 75.
108. 207 F.3d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 2000).
109. Id. at 396-98.
110. Id. at 398.
111. See id. at 400.
112. Id.
113. 427 F.3d 471, 478 (7th Cir. 2005).
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and distinct sentencing enhancement based upon the age of the
victim.114
Although the crimes in all three of these cases are quite different
from the crimes discussed throughout this Note,115 that difference
is not a bar to consideration of the homelessness of the victim in
cases involving violence against the homeless. First, in Irving and
Julian, the court deemed the victims vulnerable solely because they
were homeless. Second, in all three of the cases discussed above, the
victims were especially vulnerable to being coerced into committing
illegal acts because of their homelessness. In those cases, the
victims were taking part in the crime with the defendant, although
not necessarily voluntarily. Thus, homelessness should be a factor
in applying the vulnerable victim sentencing enhancement when the
defendant is committing the crime against the victim. The victims
in all three cases arguably had some degree of choice in participat-
ing in the crime, but were found to be particularly susceptible to
falling prey to such a decision because of their homelessness. By
contrast, homeless people do not voluntarily become victims of vio-
lent crimes, yet they are particularly vulnerable to being attacked
because of the very fact that they are homeless. It follows that, once
a court determines that homelessness can be a factor when applying
the vulnerable victim sentencing adjustment, it remains a factor to
consider regardless of the crime.
b. Homelessness as a Proxy for Vulnerability
Even without homelessness as an independent consideration,
however, there are other factors that courts have recognized as
rendering a victim vulnerable that are closely linked with homeless-
ness. For example, some courts have considered the consciousness
of the victim. The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have found
a sleeping victim vulnerable for purposes of applying the sentencing
enhancement. The Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Wetchie, has
been cited numerous times for its application of the vulnerable
114. Id. at 489-90.
115. None of the crimes discussed in Part III.B.2.a involved violence per se toward the
victim, and two of the three crimes were sexual in nature.
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victim sentencing guideline to a sleeping victim.116 The defendant
sexually assaulted his victim while she was sleeping in a youth
center.117 The court found that because the victim was assaulted
while sleeping, she was unable to resist or cry out for help until the
assault was already underway or finished.118 Additionally, the
assault may not have occurred had the victim been awake; in other
words, the fact that the victim was asleep may have encouraged the
defendant to commit the criminal act.119 To summarize, the Ninth
Circuit considered two factors: (1) the ability of the victim to defend
him or herself while sleeping, and (2) the opportunity the sleeping
victim gives to a potential criminal. 
Similarly, in United States v. Plenty, the Eighth Circuit deemed
a victim vulnerable for the sole reason that she was asleep when the
crime occurred.120 The defendant was convicted of breaking and
entering the victim’s residence and assaulting her in her sleep.121
The defendant awoke the victim by punching her in the face, and
dragged her out of the house while continuing to punch and kick
her.122 In reliance on Wetchie, the court found that because the
victim was asleep, she could not procure help, run away, or defend
herself.123 Therefore, the court declared the victim to be vulnerable
under the United States Sentencing Guidelines.124
In another case, United States v. Newsom, the district court held
that the victim was vulnerable because she was asleep while the
defendant, who was subsequently convicted of child pornography,
filmed her.125 The Seventh Circuit, relying in part on Plenty and
Wetchie, narrowed the district court’s decision by stating that simply
being watched or videotaped while unaware is not enough to render
a victim vulnerable.126 In Newsom, however, the defendant also
116. 207 F.3d 632 (9th Cir. 2000). For a more recent Ninth Circuit case involving the
vulnerable victim sentencing enhancement and a sleeping victim, see United States v. Snow,
184 F. App’x 618 (9th Cir. 2006).
117. Wetchie, 207 F.3d at 633.
118. Id. at 634.
119. Id.
120. 335 F.3d 732, 735 (8th Cir. 2003).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 733.
123. Id. at 735.
124. Id.
125. 402 F.3d 780, 785 (7th Cir. 2005).
126. Id.
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moved the victim’s underwear, which “would have been impossible
had [the victim] been awake.”127 This language implies that some
unwanted physical contact with the victim while the victim is asleep
is necessary in order to render the victim vulnerable.
These cases make clear that the state of being asleep renders a
victim “particularly susceptible to ... criminal conduct”128 for pur-
poses of applying the vulnerable victim sentencing enhancement.
Although two of the cases involve sex crimes, Plenty shows that
finding a sleeping victim vulnerable for purposes of the sentencing
enhancement is appropriate in assault cases as well. The homeless
are often forced to sleep in public, and attacks are common while
they are sleeping.129 Of course, applying the vulnerable victim sen-
tencing adjustment is fact specific, but these precedents could be
extended to cases in which a homeless victim was attacked while
sleeping.130
Finally, age and physical and mental condition are enumerated
as factors to consider in the federal vulnerable victim sentencing
guideline.131 Although this Note advocates that the homelessness of
a victim alone should be a consideration in applying the vulnerable
victim sentencing enhancement—and in fact should be added as a
specified factor in the guidelines—age and physical and mental
condition can clearly bolster the case for administering the in-
creased sentence. The age range of homeless victims for the past ten
years is four months to seventy-four years of age.132 On either end
of the spectrum, the age of the homeless victim probably renders the
victim vulnerable for purposes of the statute. Additionally, persons
with severe mental illness represented over a quarter of all shel-
tered homeless individuals, and persons with chronic substance
abuse problems accounted for over a third of all sheltered homeless
individuals.133 Again, these factors affecting the physical and mental
127. Id.
128. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 24, § 3A1.1 cmt. n.2.
129. See, e.g., COALITION HOMELESS REPORT, supra note 9, at 64, 68-71, 73, 79-83 (reporting
incidents of homeless individuals being attacked or robbed while they are sleeping).
130. Those homeless who cannot secure a bed in a shelter usually end up sleeping in a
public area and are thus more vulnerable to crime while asleep. 
131. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 24, § 3A1.1 cmt. n.2.
132. COALITION HOMELESS REPORT, supra note 9, at 18.
133. See GOVERNMENT HOMELESS REPORT, supra note 1, at 17. The use of statistics for the
sheltered homeless is necessary in this case because these particular statistics are more
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condition of a homeless victim would reinforce a court’s application
of the vulnerable victim sentencing enhancement. In general, these
cases illustrate how courts have used homelessness as a factor in
the application of vulnerable victim sentencing guidelines, along
with how courts can consider additional factors particularly suited
to the homeless in conjunction with the homeless victim’s status in
the guidelines’ application.
CONCLUSION
Enhanced punishments are a useful tool in communicating
society’s condemnation of a particular type of crime. Hate crime
statutes and vulnerable victim sentencing guidelines both offer
enhanced punishments based on the criminal’s choice of victim.
Hate crimes protect self-identifying groups based on either an
immutable characteristic or a characteristic that applies to everyone
equally. By contrast, vulnerable victim sentencing guidelines protect
those within society who are deemed more vulnerable based on a
particular trait that is either set forth in the statute or delineated
by the court.
The homeless deserve the extra protection of enhanced punish-
ment. With the downturn in the economy, the flurry of housing
foreclosures, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it seems likely
that the homeless population is due to increase, at least in the near
future. Along with this growth in population comes the increased
threat of violence against the homeless. In addition to being at-
tacked by individual members of society, the homeless are also
subject to laws that criminalize their livelihood. Enhanced punish-
ment laws reflect the notion that the homeless are not second-class
citizens, and they condemn the unusually brutal crimes committed
against the homeless. Although homeless advocates tend to cham-
pion the addition of the homeless to hate crime statutes, protection
under vulnerable victim sentencing guidelines is a better alterna-
tive.
Protection of the homeless is better suited to a more flexible stan-
dard than that which hate crime legislation provides. Homelessness
is a mutable trait that does not apply to everyone, and society is
constantly trying to find ways to shrink the homeless population. In
reliable and available than those for the unsheltered homeless.
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addition, the status of homelessness makes an individual physically
more vulnerable to crimes than the general population. Because of
these reasons, homelessness, at least on a theoretical level, is better
suited to vulnerable victim sentencing guidelines.
Homelessness is better suited to protection under the vulnerable
victim sentencing guideline on a practical level as well. Certain
courts have already found that homelessness is a factor in rendering
a victim vulnerable for purposes of the federal statute. Other factors
also exist, such as whether the victim was asleep, and the victim’s
age, physical condition, and mental health. In addition to the
homelessness of the victim, consideration of these factors would
strengthen the case for applying the sentencing enhancement when
the court is weighing whether to apply the standard. In jurisdictions
where the catchall vulnerable victim’s phrase is utilized, courts can
currently begin applying the vulnerable victim sentencing guide-
lines. In all jurisdictions, especially those without the catchall
phrase, legislatures must take steps to write new statutes that
include the homeless as a protected category, or amend existing
statutes. Either way, it is imperative that the legal system act to
protect the most vulnerable and unfortunate in society from violent
crimes. Covering the homeless under vulnerable victim sentencing
guidelines is an excellent beginning to achieving that goal.
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